The original post: /r/history by /u/T0DEtheELEVATED on 2025-02-15 08:06:45.

Note: I am not a historian, nor am I any form of expert, but I do enjoy studying the Holy Roman Empire: this is a short summation of some of the things I’ve learned, and I hope it can help y’all in learning about the polity.

The Holy Roman Empire (The Empire, or Reich) is one of the most misunderstood polities in European history. Voltaire’s quib, that the Empire was neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire, is one such example. Since the dawn of time (more precisely, since Aristotelian philosophy in the words of Peter Wilson), the desire to classify things into clearly defined categories has been enacted upon. We see the same in historiography. For many years, historians have sought to explain one key question pertaining to the Empire: What is it? Is it a state? Is it a federation? Is it an alliance? Can we compare it to the European Union?

19th and 20th century historiography is somewhat guilty for the Empire’s bad perception, German historiography in particular. German historians, whose works were often focused on the nationalist rise of the Prusso-German nation state, regarded the Empire as a failure of an entity: a low point in national development. James Madison wrote a paper on what he believed were the failures of the Empire. It was only after the idea of a Prusso-militaristic centralized German nation-state was challenged that the Empire began to see a new light. Since the 1960s, the Imperial institutions of the Aulic Council (Reichshofrat) and Reichskammergericht have been extensively researched, for example. Even though there is some new popular research that has proposed the Empire pre-Westphalia (The Treaty of Westphalia, 1648) was relatively centralized (as centralized as a medieval-esque polity can be, which isn’t much), many will still point out that the Empire after Westphalia was a mere formality, an entity that had little to no central power: a collection of “independent” princes.

But I would challenge this view point. Rather, I say that the Empire after Westphalia had plenty of collective authority. Some historians, such as Heinz H. F. Eulau, saw the HRE as a sort of federal entity. Though I approach this term tentatively (I hesitate to label the Empire’s political system as a singular concept), this idea has merit. This can be supported by evidence like the local Imperial Circles, or Kreis. The circles, being a grouping of Imperial estates, often banded together for collective security. Imperial estates of course were free to practice their own law (Landeshoheit, territorial jurisdiction) and diplomacy: for example, Wittelsbach electoral foreign policy (in the Palatinate and Bavaria) often went against Imperial prerogative. This is not to say that the estates were free to do whatever they wanted. The Empire had numerous legal institutions to enforce authority on all princes, often with help from the circles.

I point to the crisis in Brandenburg-Kulmbach (1716). Complex inheritance law and some Prussian shenanigans meant that the small principality was at risk of being “annexed” by its much larger Hohenzollern cousin. An appeal by Kulmbach to the Schönborn chancellery of Mainz and Emperor Charles VI went to the Aulic Council (Reichshofrat), which promptly declared Prussia’s succession claims to the principality were invalid, and defended the rights of Kulmbach. Prussia complied with the Aulic Council’s demands, and the Kulmbach crisis was settled. War was averted. A Kulmbach commenter is reported to have stated, “at least in Germany we no longer have to rely on weapons, but on due process, which gives the weaker estates cause to rejoice” [1].

This process is known as juridification (Verrechtlichung), in which legal methods were employed to settle disputes instead of war. As historians have remarked, the HRE is quite famous for this. Despite its high militarization, many conflicts in the Empire were settled without escalating to war. In the time conflict did arise, circles could be ordered to create commissions, which would help deal with disobedient rulers. Hesse-Kassel’s refusal to obey Imperial demands in the Rheinfels affair (1718) led to intervention by local estates, namely the Palatinate, Mainz, and Trier, who engaged in skirmishes with the Hessians. The threat of Imperial soldiers returning from the Turkish War (1716-1718) made the Hessian Landgrave reconsider his choices, and promptly accept the Imperial mandate.

Nassau-Siegen’s tyranny during the reign of Prince William Hyacinth is another example of the collective cooperation of estates to defend Imperial law. William Hyacinth’s behavior led to numerous lawsuits at the Aulic Council, resulting in the eventual armed occupation of his princedom, at the request of the court. He was then removed from power. The Empire’s use of force to remove rulers who violated the rights of their subjects were common. Similar cases can be seen in Mecklenburg and Württemberg. The right for subjects, including peasants, to sue their rulers at the Imperial courts is special in early modern europe. Peasant delegations often arrived before the Aulic Council and Reichskammergericht (the other high court of the Empire). An agent at the Reichskammergericht is said to have stated “these kinds of lawsuits [that is, complaints against rulers] have unfortunately become so frequent of late that every day whole flocks of peasants may be seen [on their way to court]” [2]. The court also helped with financial issues amongst the estates (Debitkommissionen)

From our view of Frederick the Great’s Prussia “insolence” in the Silesian crises, one would not be fully amiss to claim that larger estates could disobey Imperial mandates. Prussia did so in a succession crisis in Tecklenburg (1729), where the Aulic Council failed to enforce their verdict (though part of this was due to a conflicting ruling by the Reichskammergericht in 1686). But these were exceptions, not the norm. For the most part, the Aulic Council could enforce many of its verdicts, even against stronger members of the Empire (ex. Prussia, Palatinate, Württemberg), to the extent that Frederick William I of Prussia, the famous “Soldier King”, resorted to bribing members of the Aulic Council. He did so in hopes of receiving favorable rulings, which he could follow to avoid being contumacious. These enforcement and arbitration mechanisms all helped establish the aforementioned principle of juridification in the Empire. It wasn’t perfect, but the Empire surely did have the ability to settle disputes, and protect the legal rights of its members.

All of this seems contrary to the general principles of Westphalia. After all, wasn’t Westphalia meant to reduce the power of the Emperor, in the favor of the estates? It is true that the 30 Years War in general saw the limitations of the Emperor’s power. In 1630, Ferdinand II, before the Electoral College, hoped to formally establish his son as Imperial heir (a practice often partaken by the Habsburgs). Ferdinand paid the price for not maintaining positive relations with the college. The same group that had unanimously elected Ferdinand in 1619 denied the confirmation of a new Habsburg heir, and demanded the Imperial withdrawal from Mantua, the removal of the unpopular Wallenstein from Imperial military service, and the merger of Wallenstein’s army with that of the army of the Catholic League.

This anger comes from a variety of roots: Wallenstein of course was one such point of conflict. The Emperor had deposed the ancient House of Mecklenburg and replaced them with Wallenstein, an “upstart” in the eyes of the great Imperial princes. The Edict of Restitution (1629), which demanded the re-Catholicization of church assets that had fallen to Protestant hands since the Peace of Augsburg (1555) was another such point of contention. Both actions, despite whatever intentions the Habsburgs may have had (some historians believe Habsburg goals were actually not intending to introduce despotism to the Empire), made the princes think that the Habsburgs were strengthening their power, and abusing the rights of the princes. This sentiment was echoed throughout Germany and beyond: a German pamphlet in 1628 expressed that Ferdinand sought to become the “master of Germany” [2].

From this context, it would be a valid assumption to make that Westphalia sought to limit Imperial power, to prevent another Edict of Restitution-esque scenario. Westphalia has been blamed for such in historiography. With the notion that a sovereign nation state was the optimal outcome in national development, historians sought to blame something for the great failure that is Germany unifying last: Westphalia was an easy event to blame. However, it is disputed whether or not Westphalia really weakened the position of the Emperor in the Empire, at least compared to 1618 (before the 30 Years War). We already went over the judicial powers of the courts, but even in the Diet (the Empire’s “legislature”) at least, the Emperor still had significant power, not just from a voting perspective (the Emperor’s large hausmacht (crownland) carried many Diet votes with it; the same is true with many of the larger estates, in particular the Electors). After 1670, the Emperor even managed to gain dominance in the diet so that they received the right to veto resolutions. “the Diet became, in part at least, an instrument of the emperor’s power in the Empire. The possibility of hindering and vetoing und…

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