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cybernews.com

Google’s latest flagship smartphone raises concerns about user privacy and security. It frequently transmits private user data to the tech giant before any app is installed. Moreover, the Cybernews research team has discovered that it potentially has remote management capabilities without user awareness or approval.

Cybernews researchers analyzed the new Pixel 9 Pro XL smartphone’s web traffic, focusing on what a new smartphone sends to Google.

“Every 15 minutes, Google Pixel 9 Pro XL sends a data packet to Google. The device shares location, email address, phone number, network status, and other telemetry. Even more concerning, the phone periodically attempts to download and run new code, potentially opening up security risks,” said Aras Nazarovas, a security researcher at Cybernews…

… “The amount of data transmitted and the potential for remote management casts doubt on who truly owns the device. Users may have paid for it, but the deep integration of surveillance systems in the ecosystem may leave users vulnerable to privacy violations,” Nazarovas said…

  • @[email protected]
    0•3 months ago

    I like calyx, might try graphene some day. But I absolutely won’t run Google’s play services ala graphene. It’s sandboxed, supposedly, but why run it at all?

    Calyx uses microG, a much smaller, fully open source emulator of Google’s services.

      • @[email protected]
        0•3 months ago

        Just about all of your identifying data is stripped out by the framework before interacting with Google at all: https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/wiki/Google-Network-Connections

        That alone makes it an important tool. I’m not too worried about memory exploits as I don’t really install apps, but it’s an important feature in graphene’s toolkit.

        For most people who want an Android alternative that’s open source but don’t have time to fiddle with it, calyxOS seems like a good solution. It just works out of the box.

        • Andromxda 🇺🇦🇵🇸🇹🇼English
          0•3 months ago

          Just about all of your identifying data is stripped out by the framework before interacting with Google at all

          For all of them, we strip device identifier (MAC addresses, IMEI, etc)

          This is literally nothing special, as all user-installed apps are denied access to identifiers like the IMEI and MAC address since Android 10. Since GrapheneOS isolates Play services in the Android application sandbox, they don’t have access to any of these identifiers either.

          I’m not too worried about memory exploits as I don’t really install apps

          That’s not how memory corruption exploits work. These can occur anywhere in the system, and just need to be triggered by an attacker. This doesn’t require you to install an app, receiving a rogue message might for example be enough to exploit a memory vulnerability in the SMS app. Visiting a rogue website, which loads malicious JavaScript can be enough to trigger a memory corruption vulnerability in the Chromium WebView. That’s why GrapheneOS doesn’t just use hardened_malloc, but it also disables the JavaScript JIT compiler in Vanadium by default, and offers a toggle in the settings to disallow JavaScript JIT compilation in all apps making use of the system WebView component.

          • @[email protected]
            0•3 months ago

            Very nice. Can I use the much smaller codebase of microG instead of Google’s? Even you do not know how Play Services actually works, and that’s a problem.

            Further, a memory exploit that leads to compromise would need a chain of privilege escalation. There’s a lot in the way of making that trivial even on stock Android. And you know what helps reduce risk of exploit? Smaller codebases.

            • Andromxda 🇺🇦🇵🇸🇹🇼English
              0•3 months ago

              If you only care about security, you should keep Play Services isolated in a separate profile. That way, even if there happens to be a memory corruption vulnerability in Play services, which isn’t caught by hardened_malloc or the hardware MTE in newer devices with ARMv9 chips, the rest of your system would still be safe, since Play services aren’t running as root, and in order to compromise the entire system, there would need to be a privilege escalation vulnerability in all of Android, not just Play services.

              And you know what helps reduce risk of exploit? Smaller codebases.

              Why does CalyxOS include the F-Droid privileged extension then? It’s yet another component running with elevated permissions and unnecessarily increasing attack surface. Why does it include Google’s eUICC component with elevated privileges and no proper sandboxing?

              • @[email protected]
                0•3 months ago

                Err… That component appears to be built from source per Calyx’s Gradle rules? The source is pulled from here: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/refs/heads/main/telephony/java/android/telephony/euicc

                My hardware is too old to support MTE. I’m running a pixel 3 because I’m more worried about damaging our earthly environment with this constant hardware churn.

                I’m sorry you’re unhappy that I’m happy. I’m still able to run Android 14 in a reasonably secure manner, I’m able to exchange information with other people easily, without Google getting much information from me, and that’s satisfactory. My actual security relevant machinations happen on my much better protected laptop.

                Thanks for your input, have a nice day.

    • Andromxda 🇺🇦🇵🇸🇹🇼English
      0•3 months ago

      but why run it at all?

      Because it is unfortunately required by some apps. microG is not a viable alternative, as it requires root access on the device, which drastically reduces the security. It also has worse compatibility than Sandboxed Play services, and doesn’t offer much of a benefit. It still downloads and executes proprietary Google blobs in the background in order to function. Apps that require Google services also include a proprietary Google library, making microG essentially useless. It’s an open source layer that sits between a proprietary library and a proprietary network service, using proprietary binaries and requiring root access. You gain absolutely nothing from using it, and significantly increase the attack surface of your device.

      fully open source emulator

      This is simply false, as I explained, only a tiny bit of what microG requires to function is open source

      You’re far better off using Sandboxed Play services on GrapheneOS